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THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND: VOLUNTARY
INTEGRATION OF SEXUAL MINORITIES
INTO THE U.S. MILITARY
Jennifer Gerarda Brown*

&

Ian Ayres**

"The human heart is the starting point of all matters pertaining to war."
- Marshal Maurice de Saxe1
"What we do and what we think is fascinatingly dependent, much of the
time, on what we believe that other people do and think."
- Cass Sunstein2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many opponents of gays in the military will accept the proposition
that gay and lesbian soldiers,3 most of them closeted, have served their
country bravely and well. General Colin Powell has referred to gay
service members as "proud, brave, loyal, good Americans"4 who have
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1982, Bryn Mawr; J.D. 1985, University of Illinois. - Ed.
** William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1963, J.D. 1986, Yale; Ph.D.
(Economics) 1988, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. - Ed. For helpful comments and
conversations, we thank David Cruz, William Eskridge, Barney Frank, Diane Mazur, Linda
Meyer, Kenji Yoshino, and workshop participants at UCLA, USC, Colorado, Georgetown,
and Australian National universities. Jessica Ballou, Gowri Ramachandran, Eric McGrew,
Richard Gora, and Fadi Hanna provided helpful research assistance.

1. Marshal Maurice de Saxe, My Reveries Upon the A rt of War (1757), in ROOTS OF
A COLLECTI ON OF MILITARY CLASSICS 177 (Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips
trans., ed., 1940).
STRATEGY:

2. Cass R. Sunstein, Situationism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 13, 2000, at 42, 46
(reviewing MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A
B IG DIFFERENCE (2000)).
3. For simplicity's sake, we will use the terms "gay and lesbian" to refer to sexual
minorities of various sorts, especially gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered
people. We do not mean to treat all sexual minorities monolithically, because important
differences might make our proposal more workable for some groups than for others. Cf.
Diane H. Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis ofSex: Must Gay Women Be Admitted
to the Military Even if Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953 (1997) (arguing that men and
women could legitimately receive disparate treatment with respect to the ban on
homosexuality in the military). Similarly, and again for simplicity's sake, we will often use
the term "soldier" to refer to service members of all branches of the military, and "army" to
refer to the military generally.
4. 1993 Defense Budget House Hearing, 102d Cong., at 45 (1993).
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"served well in the past and are continuing to serve well."5 General H.
Norman Schwartzkopf agrees: "homosexuals have served in the past
and have done a great job serving their country. "6
What these opponents find harder to accept is the proposition that
heterosexual people can effectively serve their country if openly gay
people are in the military with them. The fear is that if openly gay and
lesbian people are allowed to serve, they will make other soldiers
uncomfortable. This discomfort will cause a breakdown in morale and
discipline, destroying the "unit cohesion" that is essential for effective
soldiering.
To show that these fears have perpetuated an exclusion policy that
is overbrcad, this Essay proposes the creation of inclusive commands
in the U.S. military.7 Gay and non-gay soldiers would effectively
volunteer for inclusive commands by answering "no" to the following
question: Would you prefer to serve in a command without any gay
personnel? Soldiers who were not willing to serve with gay people
would be assigned to alternative, exclusive commands based upon
their answer to the sorting question. Placement in an inclusive
command would therefore be entirely voluntary. It bears emphasizing
that the inclusive command would combine gay and nongay service
members. The point of the proposal is not to create a segregated unit
just for sexual minorities, for this might reinforce stereotypes and
prejudice. A "gay" command would fail to address the unit cohesion
problem head on. Therefore, the command should be "inclusive."
This Essay also is an application of the theory of ambiguation,8 a
concept we borrow from the work of Lawrence Lessig.9 Lessig argues
that people can deploy rhetorical devices to change a society's shared
understanding of the meaning conveyed by a given word or action.
One of the rhetorical devices Lessig discusses is "ambiguation," which
gives "the particular act, the meaning of which is to be regulated, a
second meaning as well, one that acts to undermine the negative
effects of the first. "10 The very act of saying that you are willing to
5. S. Hrg. No. 103-845, Ex. JX-1, vol. 3, at 707.
6. Id. at 612 (testimony of Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf).
7. A command is any military unit, post, district, or region under the control of one
officer. This could be an Air Force base, an Army hospital, or a single submarine. We delib
erately use the rather general term "command" here to leave open the many possibilities for
implementing our proposal. Some types of commands are easier to integrate than others. A
hospital or medical unit even today would contain a higher proportion of openly gay,
lesbian, and bisexual service members than an infantry unit in the U.S. Marines.
8. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: MOBILIZING
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GA y RIGHTS, ch. 5 (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the
strategy of ambiguation and its applicability to issues of sexual orientation).
9. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
(1995).
10. Id.

REV.

943, 1010
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serve with gay soldiers might make some people wonder whether you
yourself are gay. As the set of people who are understood possibly to
be gay expands, people's understanding of what it means to be gay
also changes, and stereotypes erode.
The inclusive command would challenge some heterosexual
soldiers to "come out" as supporters of gay rights and in so doing raise
questions about their own sexuality. The fact that soldiers would be
forced to answer the question "yea" or "nay" marks a turn toward
more uncomfortable choices. Some soldiers might prefer not to have
to answer this type of question. But studies show that Americans age
18-29 are less likely than the generation before them to support
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Indeed, a large
majority of people in this age group believe that gay men and lesbians
should be permitted to serve openly in the U.S. military.11 When faced
with the option, we will ultimately argue, many soldiers today will opt
for the inclusive command.
These changing attitudes also suggest an answer to skeptics who
might protest that our proposal inappropriately calls for the military to
engage in social engineering. The point is that tolerance for
homosexuality has grown in American society, particularly among the
age group most likely to serve in today's military. Granted, our
proposal calls for innovative policy making and some willingness on
the part of senior personnel to depart from well-worn rules. The goal
is not simply to create new acceptance for sexual minorities, but to
demonstrate that this acceptance already exists among large groups of
potential recruits.
We explicitly seek incremental progress. To that end, we propose
two distinct, intermediate stages on the path toward non
discrimination. In each stage, the military would ask recruits distinct
questions, and the answers would have distinct consequences. The
essential difference between the stages of integration is that in stage I,
our system would not require any changes in the current "don't ask,
don't tell" ("DADT") policy, and soldiers in both types of commands
would remain closeted, but in stage II, DADT would be lifted for the
inclusive command and service members assigned to that command
would be free to speak openly about their sexual orientations.
Let us begin with stage I. All soldiers would be asked two
questions:
Question No. 1 : Your answer to this first question will be kept
confidential (and your answer will have no effect on your future
assignments or treatment). Would you be willing to serve in a
command with openly gay service personnel?

11. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Question No. 2: Your answer to this second question will not be
kept confidential. If you answer "no" you will be assigned to an
"inclusive" command. If you answer "yes" you will be assigned to
an "exclusive" command. Would you prefer to serve in a command
without any gay personnel?
The first question elicits information about whether service
members are comfortable serving with openly gay colleagues. Since
the answers to this question will be kept confidential, the question is
likely to provide feedback on the level of discomfort, which is the
premise for the "unit cohesion" concern. It also pushes recruits a bit to
consider what they would be "willing" to do - a lower standard than
what they might "prefer" to do. The question does not specify the
conditions under which the recruit would be "willing" to serve with
openly gay people (e.g., is this pursuant to an order or merely a
request from commanding officers?). Even recruits who prefer not to
serve with openly gay people might respond that they are "willing" to
do so under some circumstance they imagine as they answer the
question.
The second question asks not about willingness to serve with
openly gay people, but about preferences. To answer yes to the second
question, a recruit must prefer not to serve with any gay personnel whether openly gay or closeted. On the one hand, the threshold for
giving an anti-gay response to this question is lower than for Question
1, because even recruits who dislike homosexuality and would prefer
not to serve with anyone who is gay might be "willing" to serve with
openly gay people if asked to do so. On the other hand, Question 2
asks about preferences regarding any gay people, not just openly gay
people. Some recruits might be unwilling to serve with openly gay
people but neutral regarding service with closeted gay people (thus
they would answer "no" to the second question, even though they are
not willing to serve with openly gay people). Although this may at first
seem a perverse result, on closer examination it is consistent with the
function of these questions to channel only the most prejudiced
recruits into the exclusive command. Particularly in stage I, when
DADT remains in effect even for the inclusive command, recruits who
are neutral regarding closeted gay service members belong in the
inclusive command.
In stage II of this evolving plan of integration, the statutes and
regulations comprising the DADT policy would require amendment
to permit but not require gay and lesbian members of inclusive
commands to come out. All soldiers would be asked a single question:
Your answer to this question will not be kept confidential. If you
answer "yes" you will be assigned to an "inclusive" command. If
you answer "no" you will be assigned to an "exclusive" command.
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Would you be willing to serve in a command with openly gay
service personnel?
In stage II, DADT would still be in effect for the exclusive
command - so that soldiers who wanted to avoid serving with openly
gay soldiers could do so. But in the second stage, the inclusive
command would become a space in which openly gay and lesbian
soldiers could serve their country and willing heterosexual soldiers
could serve with them. Even stage II would be an intermediate,
evolutionary step in the progression from exclusion, through DADT,
to the ultimate goal: mandatory, wholesale integration of sexual
minorities into the armed services.
The inclusive command would help to unpack and challenge the
changing justifications for disqualifying gay people from military
service. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
rationales were always centered on the gay soldiers themselves: they
were said to be security risks, mentally unstable,12 cowardly,13 and
lacking in discipline.14 Over time, however, these rationales started to
erode. This change was inevitable as highly decorated, clearly effective
soldiers came out or were exposed as gay or lesbian.15 The many
12. MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE
113-18 (1993). According to Akhil Amar and Alan Hirsch, the official policy against gays in
the military resulted largely from "historical accident":
Many soldiers returned .from World War I suffering from shell shock. The emerging
psychiatric profession offered to help the government minimize such problems in the future
by screening soldiers to keep out the mentally ill or poorly adjusted. At the time,
homosexuality was regarded as a mental illness, so the screening policy kept identified
homosexuals out of the armed forces.
AKHIL REED AMAR & A LAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION
REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 141 (1998).

13. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY 15 (1993) (quoting psychiatrist Albert Abrams, who wrote in his 1918 essay,
"Homosexuality - A Military Menace," that "the homosexualist is not only dangerous, but
an ineffective fighter").
14. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 118-19; Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A
Critique of "Gays in the Military " Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223,
234 (1996).
15. See, e.g. , Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning "a
highly decorated nurse" who received the Bronze Star for distinguished service in Vietnam
but who was discharged because she was a lesbian); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (concerning "an exceptional midshipman" who earned "the respect and praise of his
superior officers" and for whom "the sky was the limit" who was discharged from the Naval
Academy two weeks before graduation because he disclosed his homosexuality to a
classmate); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(concerning an openly gay man described as "an outstanding soldier" and repeatedly
promoted during his twelve years of service during and after Vietnam conflict; when
Watkins sued to prevent his discharge, the court ruled that the Army could not discharge
Watkins on the basis of his sexual orientation because it was disclosed at the time Watkins
was drafted); see also SHILTS, supra note 13 (describing the history of gay men and lesbians
in the U.S. military and the occasional "purges" that would result in the exposure and
termination of many gay and lesbian soldiers).
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promotions and glowing reviews these soldiers received during their
service showed that they had discipline and courage. 16 The almost
universal opm1on within the psychiatric community that
homosexuality is not a mental illness17 made it untenable for the
military to argue that gay people were inherently less stable than any
other group. The illogic of the ban started to become clear as gay
rights advocates pointed out that emotional problems and security
breaches were more likely to occur if soldiers were forced to hide their
sexual orientation; lifting the ban would mitigate rather than
aggravate these risks.
Nonetheless, when President Bill Clinton proposed to lift the ban
upon taking office in early 1993, Congress balked. Ultimately, the
compromise DADT policy emerged - a policy which, in theory,
forbids military officials from asking whether soldiers are gay or
lesbian, but also forbids gay and lesbian soldiers to be open about
their orientation.18 While this policy may have many flaws, 19 the

16. See MARY ANN HUMPHREY. MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE: EXPERIENCES
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT (1990).
17. AM.

PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS

261-83, 380 (3d ed. 1980); SHILTS, supra note 13, at 715; Am. Med. Ass'n, Health
Care Needs of the Homosexual Population, at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_
online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-160.991.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (calling
for a "physician's nonjudgmental recognition of sexual orientation" and instructing
physicians to "oppose[ ) . . . therapy that is based upon the assumption that homosexuality
per se is a mental disorder").
18. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b)(l) (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) Policy.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the

armed forces under

regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is
made ...

(1)

That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage

in a homosexual act or acts ...
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is homosexual or bisexual ...
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same
biological sex.

The "don't ask" portion of the policy is contained in a regulation which states that
"[a]pplicants for enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to
reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual." Dep't of Def. Directive No.
1304.26, encl. 1, 'j[ E 1.2.8.1 (Dec. 21, 1993). See also Dep't of Def. Directive Nos. 1332.30 &
1332.14 (applying "don't ask" policy to officers and enlisted service members, respectively,
in the course of their service). Thus, while the "don't tell" part of the policy is enshrined in
statute, the "don't ask" portion is "strictly a regulatory creation." Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell'', 108 YALE L.J. 485, 539 (1998).
19. Not the least of these flaws is the fact that discharges due to homosexuality have
accelerated rather than slowed since its inception. See Philip Shenon, Pentagon Moving to
End Abuses of' Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at Al (noting that
67% more gay and lesbian troops were discharged in 1997 - a total of 997 individuals than were discharged in 1994, the first full year the DADT policy was in effect). More recent
drops in discharges are due to America's temporary involvement in war rather than any
permanent shift in the practical effects of the policy. See John Files, Study Says Discharges
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Congressional debates leading to its implementation achieved
something valuable: they showed that some rationales for the ban on
gays in the military seem to be off the table. Security risks, cowardice,
and mental illness of gay people have, for the most part, lost
respectability in this debate.
The argument shifted. The new mantra became "unit cohesion."
Indeed, when gay and lesbian service members have challenged the
DADT policy, the government has defended not by raising any of the
old justifications for the homosexual exclusion policy, but by resting
upon "unit cohesion," protecting "the privacy of heterosexuals," and
reducing "sexual tension."20
If we unpack "unit cohesion," however, we see that the point of
concern has actually shifted; the anticipated source of rule violations,
breakdown in discipline, and insubordination has changed. The
problem, it turns out, is not so much the gay soldier himself, but the
reaction he is likely to elicit in others: their fear of the "gay gaze,"
their feelings of invaded privacy, their hostility. Put more pointedly,
the fear is not so much that openly gay soldiers will violate military
rules or underperform, but rather that one soldier's open
homosexuality will cause another soldier to fall short in executing his
duties.21
Interestingly, the "unit cohesion" argument thus works in precisely
the opposite direction from "diversity" rationales for affirmative
action in higher education. In the educational context, the argument is
that everyone will learn more, and more effectively, if the students
bring to the enterprise a diverse array of experiences, some of which
may flow from their personal characteristics, such as gender, race, age,
Continue Under 'Don 't Ask, Don't Tell' , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A18 (suggesting that
America's involvement in war may counteract the otherwise steady increase in discharges of
homosexuals, and noting that 787 were discharged in 2003, "the lowest number since 1995,"
compared with 906 in 2002 and 1,273 in 2001); Beth Fouhy, Soldier Dismissed After
Revealing He's Gay, FindLaw, at http:/lnews.findlaw.com/ap_stories/a/w/1152/6-21-2004/2004
0621051504_40.html (June 21, 2004) (noting that 770 people were discharged for homo
sexuality in 2003, a reduction from 1,227 discharges in 2001, "before the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq").
20. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The government does not justify its discrimination by
reference to some defect in the performance of homosexuals, or claim that they represent a
security risk as likely targets for blackmail," but instead "says that the Act helps foster unit
cohesion, promotes the privacy of heterosexuals, and reduces sexual tensions.")
21. Judge Eugene Nickerson came straight to the point in describing this rationale:
"[T]he known presence of homosexuals may disrupt the unit because heterosexual members
may morally disapprove of homosexuals. This is an outright confession that 'unit cohesion' is
a euphemism for catering to the prejudices of heterosexuals." Id. See also Yoshino, supra
note 18, at 553 ("[T]he justifications for 'don't ask, don't tell' - unit cohesion, privacy, and
sexual tension - primarily focus not on the gay servicemember but on the straight
servicemember. This can be counted as a pro-gay achievement, as it correctly traces the
source of the dysfunction not to the gay servicemember, but to the straight service member."
(internal footnote omitted)).
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and religion Gust to name a few).22 In the military context, on the
other hand, the fear seems to be that some forms of diversity will
prove so challenging, so distracting, that soldiers' ability to learn and
perform will be compromised.
Military officials faced a similar dynamic when they proposed
racial integration of the armed forces. Military commanders believed
that white and black soldiers could not live and work together; morale,
discipline, and unit cohesion would suffer. Notwithstanding these
fears, officials determined that wholesale integration was necessary.
Many contend that this integration has been a success, proving that
prejudice and fear can be overcome when soldiers subject themselves
to the discipline demanded by military life.23 While some critics have
argued that the military should follow the same path in integrating
the armed forces with respect to race and sexual orientation,
Congressional repeal of DADT in the short term is unlikely.
Therefore, this Essay proposes a more incremental approach, one that
does not launch a direct, normative attack on DADT, but instead
attempts to demonstrate that the policy rests upon fears that are
baseless - even in a military setting. Stage I calls for changes that
could be implemented by executive order, without Congressional
action.
If, as Judge Eugene Nickerson has asserted, "the only conceivable
way that the presence of known homosexuals could undermine the
cohesion of the unit is 'by the negative reactions of service members
who disapprove of homosexuality,'"24 military officials should consider
instituting policies that seek out and nurture heterosexual soldiers who
are tolerant of homosexuality. Our proposal does just this by allowing
the perpetrators and victims of discrimination to voluntarily separate
themselves into two distinct groups.
As a purely descriptive matter, our screening mechanism is likely
to have two channeling functions that would be mutually reenforcing.
First, gay soldiers would likely opt for the inclusive command. While
gay and lesbian soldiers could also opt for an exclusive command,25 the
22. See, e.g. , Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (characterizing a diverse
university student body is a compelling state interest, and observing that diversity creates
substantial educational benefits); Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. See CHARLES c. MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK
LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996) (suggesting the military
has become the most race-egalitarian institution in American society).
24. Able, 968
1997)).

F.

Supp. at 859 (quoting Philips v. Perry, 106 F. 3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir.

25. Closeted gay individuals often find other gays or gay allies threatening, if for
different reasons than intolerant individuals find them threatening. See BYRNE FONE,
HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 6 (2000) ("Homophobia is not limited to heterosexuals, of
course. It can also be found among . . . repressed homosexuals."). This might stem from a
fundamental fear of being outed, either within the military, or within their personal lives,
and will cause some gay soldiers to opt for the exclusive command.
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screening mechanism would probably reduce their incentives to do
so.26 After all, fellow soldiers in the exclusive command are there
because they've expressed a preference not to serve with any gay
people.
Second, intolerant heterosexual soldiers are likely to opt for the
exclusive command. Intolerant soldiers - taking into account the
channeling effect on gay soldiers - can reduce their expected contact
with gay soldiers by opting for the exclusive command. And intolerant
soldiers are also likely to be less willing to ambiguate their own
sexuality by expressing even minimal support for gay rights.
The remaining individuals - those who don't fall into either of
these two categories - might be classified as tolerant heterosexuals.
They are neither gay (who we expect, overall, will choose the inclusive
command), nor facially intolerant toward gays (who we expect will
choose the exclusive command). As we discuss in depth later, the
choice made by these individuals is more complex, and may depend in
part on the magnitude of the two channeling effects. Tolerant soldiers
will be less likely to choose the exclusive command if it is a small,
stigmatized group. But they will also be less likely to join the inclusive
command if it is small enough to potentially mark them as gay.
This Essay's argument unfolds in three steps. Section II will
explain how the inclusive command would deliver the benefits of
amelioration, demonstration, and realignment. Section III will put our
proposal in context by presenting a brief history of exclusion and
integration in the U.S. military, with a focus on women and racial
minorities. In this section we will also consider briefly the racial
integration of schools. Our contention will be that strategies of
segregated inclusion and voluntary integration have facilitated
transition to subsequent, mandatory integration, and that analogous
strategies might be effective as gay men and lesbians take their turn at
full integration in the military.
Section IV will describe the inclusive command approach to
integrating sexual minorities into the military, and examine several
problems related to implementation. In conclusion, we will argue that

26. Indeed, we perversely considered returning to the rule of total exclusion with regard
to the exclusive command as a way of further bolstering the tendency of gays to choose the
inclusive command. Under this alternative, the military was able to "ask" and then remove
gay and lesbian soldiers from the exclusive command. Soldiers who are on the fence would
arguably feel less comfortable opting into such a system, and thus choose the inclusive
command. In equilibrium, most gay soldiers would be better off than the current regime
because they would be able to opt for a safer environment, the inclusive command, and a
greater number of soldiers overall may participate. But in the end, we reject this idea. The
idea of retrenchment to total exclusion, even if limited to the exclusive command, is too
unpalatable to be proposed. But see JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE
MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 1 (1999) (noting that "don't ask, don't tell" is "much, much
worse than" total exclusion since it achieves essentially the same ends, but in a way which is
less offensive and less easily contestable).
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we must not allow the "don't ask, don't tell" policy to set the
parameters for gay participation in the U.S. military. Given the
continuing centrality of military service in many conceptions of full
citizenship, as well as the substantial material benefits that accompany
service in the armed forces, this issue deserves all of the energy we can
muster to jump-start the debate. We must find new ways to integrate
openly gay people into military life.
II. THE BENEFITS OF SELF-SEGREGATION
The tendency of self-segregation by intolerant heterosexuals into
the exclusive command and by tolerant heterosexuals and gay and
lesbian soldiers into the inclusive command will produce three distinct
types of benefits: a melioration (of current discrimination),
demonstration (that the unit cohesion rationale does not require the
exclusion or closeting of gay and lesbian soldiers), and realignment of
political allies and enemies (creating a common cause for pro-gay
legislators on the left and pro-defense legislators on the right).
TABLE 1: EVOLVING EFFECTS OF THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND
STAGE II
STAGE I
TYPE OF EFFECT
Speech and conduct
AMELIORATION
More supportive
discrimination
environment
eliminated
Reduced chance of
Safe haven for gays in
harassment, abuse,
exclusive unit if outed
outing, or witch hunts
or come out
Testing whether
DEMONSTRATION Testing number of
soldiers willing to serve heterosexual and
openly gay soldiers can
with gay people
Testing relative
work together
effectively
performance of
inclusive and exclusive Testing whether
openly gay soldiers are
commands
more likely to violate
military code
REALIGNMENT

Attract supporters of individual choice
Attract supporters of unit cohesion
Attract supporters of strong defense and boost
recruitment
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At first blush, the inclusive command concept might appear to
aggravate rather than ameliorate discrimination in the military on the
basis of sexual orientation. One of the clear consequences of the
proposal is to create "safe" spaces, but those spaces protect both those
who support and those who oppose the inclusion of gay men and
lesbians in the military. The exclusive command, by insulating some
soldiers from openly gay and lesbian fellow soldiers, might be seen as
legitimizing the desire for such insulation. Granted, to the extent the
inclusive command rests upon a system of "separate but equal"
classifications, it will strike many readers as distasteful, and even quite
harmful.27 Certainly, compared to a world in which gay and lesbian
citizens are freely admitted into the service without restrictions
peculiar to their sexual orientation, the inclusive command is not
attractive. But if we take as our starting point the world we actually
occupy, where the DADT policy constrains gay peoples' speech and
conduct, heterosexuals are never given the opportunity to show that
they are capable of working effectively with openly gay soldiers, and
gay people are regularly discharged from the service because of their
sexual orientation, the inclusive command gains important ground, if
only as a set of temporary strategies. At the very least, the inclusive
command increases the options available to gay and heterosexual
soldiers, and thus improves their situations.
The inclusive command would ameliorate the discriminatory
character of the DADT policy in the day-to-day lives of gay soldiers.
In stage I, the inclusive command would ease the lives of gay and
lesbian soldiers by allowing them to work in units filled with fellow
soldiers who have suggested that they are not prejudiced with respect
to sexual orientation. In the inclusive unit, this reduction in prejudice
would presumably lead to a drop in homophobic jokes and comments,
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, and other anti-gay
behavior.28 These benefits would be felt immediately, because it would

27. Some readers might even wonder if it is constitutional. The answer is almost
certainly yes. The constitutionality of the current "don't ask, don't tell" policy has been
bitterly debated but generally upheld. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996),
remanded to 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F. 3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 1997). Our proposal is Jess burdensome on gay, lesbian, and bisexual service
members than that policy. Moreover, in a constitutional system that reviews classifications
based on sexual orientation under the most easily satisfied "rational basis" test, the military
should be able to show that the system is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. Indeed, courts have traditionally shown great deference to military decision
making, given the national security interests involved.
28. In theory, this atmosphere should currently exist in the military. In the Navy, for
example, the personnel chief, Vice Admiral Daniel T. Oliver, issued a memorandum on
October 28, 1999 reminding commanding officers that they "must not condone homosexual
jokes, epithets or derogatory comments, and must ensure a command climate that fosters
respect for all individuals." Elizabeth Becker & Katherine Q. Seelye, The Military Orders
Spot Check of Bases on Gay Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at Al. Yet these
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not be necessary for gay and lesbian service members to be out of the
closet in order to appreciate a more supportive environment. Simply
knowing that their fellow service members are tolerant of
homosexuality could ease the strain of DADT. Heterosexual service
members in the stage I inclusive commands, as well, would feel some
amelioration of the harassment and discrimination they can suffer if
they express support for gay rights under the current regime. Even in
stage I, while DADT still applies, the inclusive command would
ameliorate discrimination by creating a space in which gay and non
gay service members could safely and openly express their support for
gay rights.
In stage II, the inclusive command would ameliorate discrim
ination even more dramatically. Because the DADT policy would no
longer apply to inclusive commands at this stage, gay and lesbian
soldiers would be permitted to be open about their orientation. The
stage II inclusive command would alleviate the stress of secrecy that so
many gay and lesbian soldiers must bear. It would give gay and lesbian
soldiers the same rights of free speech enjoyed by heterosexual
soldiers.29 Gay and lesbian service members who opt for the exclusive
units could also benefit. Although DADT would continue to apply in
exclusive commands, the consequences of that policy could be
changed in time of transition. Closeted soldiers in the exclusive
command whose sexual orientation became public (through their own
decision to reveal it or because of others' investigations) could avoid
discharge by transferring to an inclusive command.
The inclusive command would also have evolving demonstration
effects. In stage I, the inclusive command would demonstrate, if
nothing else, the extent to which new recruits support gay rights. The
first question directly solicits recruits' preferences about serving with

policies are clearly not effective and the military knows it. A survey of service members
conducted by the Department of Defense in 1999 revealed that 80% of soldiers had "heard
offensive speech, derogatory names, jokes, or remarks about homosexuals in the last 12
months," 85% "believed such comments were tolerated to some extent," and 37% said they
had "witnessed or experienced an event or behavior toward a Service member that they
considered to be harassment based on perceived homosexuality." OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT WITH
RESPECT TO THE HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY, at i-ii (2000). See also Francis X. Clines,
Killer's Trial Shows Gay Soldier's Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at A18 (noting the

"months of vile name calling, rumor mongering," "harassment," and "taunting" that
preceded the beating to death of Pfc. Barry Winchell "with a baseball bat as he slept in his
barracks bed").
29. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S.
Military's Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1 141 (1997) (noting that DADT
implicitly requires gay and lesbian soldiers, even when silent as to their sexual orientation,
falsely to affirm assumptions that they are heterosexual).
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gay soldiers. Because this question is confidential and unrelated to the
respondent's assignment or career path, it provides powerful
information into whether DADT is necessary as a recruitment
device.30
Moreover, the second question facilitates a limited test of the unit
cohesion hypothesis itself. The self-segregating of people based upon
attitudes toward homosexuality would allow military commanders to
measure and compare the performance of these two distinct groups of
people. Under some versions of the "unit cohesion" theory, one might
expect soldiers in the exclusive command to work more effectively
(because they were less likely to have to interact with gay colleagues).
But this prediction can be tested. We might find that the service
members who selected the inclusive unit work more effectively with
people who are different from them in multiple ways than do those
who express unwillingness to serve with homosexuals. Or it is possible
that both groups would perform better when segregated than they do
when mixed together under the current system. These are empirical
questions that are impossible to answer a priori. But even while
DADT still applies in stage I, the inclusive command creates a
structure for gathering data and comparing the performance of people
with distinctly different attitudes toward homosexuality.31
In the second stage, when gay and lesbian members of the inclusive
command are permitted to be open about their orientation, a broader
test of the unit cohesion theory is possible. It would then be possible
to test whether heterosexual soldiers are rendered somehow less
effective by the "gay gaze" - that is, when they work along side
openly gay colleagues.32

30. Recent data suggest that it is not, as people in the 18- to 29-year-old age group show
increasing levels of acceptance for homosexuality. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
31. During stage II, it will become possible for commanders to identify a greater number
of service members as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This in turn will permit some comparison, as
performance levels of gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members are measured against
nongay members. This could be a positive development, as long as gay service members are
held to the same standards as nongay members. See Yoshino, supra note 18, at 544 (noting
the way DADT prevents gay and lesbian service members from disproving the assumption
that openly gay personnel cannot serve effectively).
32. In theory, it should be possible to test this even now. In some military settings, gay,
lesbian, or bisexual service members have been permitted to serve even after commanders
and fellow service members become aware of their homosexuality. Commanders of such
units could test the unit cohesion hypothesis by tracking performance levels before and after
the date on which the service member's homosexuality became widely known. While
theoretically possible, such studies are unlikely to occur because a commander might violate
DADT if he or she fails to initiate discharge proceedings against an openly gay service
member. Thus the commander's self interest precludes an admission that the gay service
member's homosexuality is or was widely known within the unit.
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Gay and lesbian soldiers have already demonstrated that the early
rationales for exclusion - emotional instability, security risks, and
ineffectiveness - were without merit. But these men and women
could only show that closeted gays could serve effectively. Never have
we created an environment in which openly gay people could prove
their abilities without fear of official reprisal.33 The inclusive command
takes us that additional step. And it takes us there not by creating a
segregated unit just for gays34 (as the United States has at times
maintained for African-American and Japanese-American soldiers),
for this would prove only that gays could serve in units reserved for
gays. An exclusively gay command would fail to address the unit cohe
sion problem head-on. Only a regime that places gay and non-gay sol
diers together - bunk-to-bunk, shoulder-to-shoulder, showerhead-to
showerhead - can prove that openly gay people can serve and (per
haps more importantly) that heterosexual people can serve with them.
The final effect of the inclusive command would be a realignment
of political interests. By allowing gay people to serve without forcing
uncomfortable heterosexual people to serve with them, the inclusive
command structure could create a common cause for gay rights
advocates on the left and various groups of conservative legislators on
the right. This effect would be particularly pronounced in stage I,
when DADT remains in place for both types of commands. Indeed,
during stage I, the inclusive command proposal appears to be Pareto
superior to the current DADT system, as every relevant participant's
position improves. By channeling gay and lesbian soldiers toward the
inclusive command, the sorting mechanism employed in stage I would

33. This may be an overstatement with respect to individuals. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that some openly gay service members have been permitted to serve and have even
received promotions. Their success seems to turn on the tolerance of commanders and
extent to which circumstances create a demand for their presence. See, e.g. , Nathaniel Frank,
Gays and Lesbians at War: Military Service in Iraq and Afghanistan under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," Working Paper, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military,
University of California, Santa Barbara (September 15, 2004), available at http://www.
gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/Frank091504_GaysAtWar.doc (noting that sexual minor
ities serve on the front lines of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom,
taking combat and combat-support roles as officers and enlisted personnel in the Army, Air
Force, Navy, and Marines, and that despite DADT, many serve openly or are known to a
majority of the troops in their unit); HUMPHREY, supra note 16, at 248-57 (noting an openly
gay man who served and received promotions during Vietnam war). Unfortunately, most of
the evidence of service by openly gay personnel tends to be anecdotal. The military cannot
acknowledge the extent to which commanders tolerate and even support the continued
service of openly gay members, since such commanders are technically violating DADT.
34. This was proposed by Miriam Ben-Shalom at the beginning of the crisis in the
Persian Gulf. She wrote to President George H.W. Bush suggesting the formation of a "gay
command" consisting of current and former service members who were gay or lesbian. She
pointed out that the government could save thousands in training costs by deploying these
soldiers, who were ready and willing to serve. See SHILTS, supra note 13, at 727.
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give homophobic service members a greater sense of insulation from
homosexuality in the exclusive command. Finally, stage I should also
dominate DADT in the minds of the military commanders who are
morally neutral on homosexuality but fear, in a purely instrumental
way, the effect integration will have on unit cohesion. Allowing people
to sort according to their attitudes toward homosexuality could
actually boost unit cohesion in both the inclusive and the exclusive
commands. Indeed, it seems the only people who would not be made
better off by the move to inclusive commands would be people who do
not like gay people and derive enjoyment from harassing and harming
them. It would be surprising to hear any legislator argue publicly that
the interests of such people must be included in the calculus.
A less positive way to describe the realignment effect is that an
inclusive command might create a wedge in traditional anti-gay
coalitions, giving legislators who are generally unsympathetic to gay
rights a reason to defect from their usual political alignment. For
example, a conservative law maker might tell her constituents that the
inclusive command will more fairly distribute the burdens and dangers
of military service, requiring gay and lesbian as well as heterosexual
citizens to show their patriotism.35 Particularly when the military has
great need for soldiers (such as when the country is waging an
unpopular war, or a strong peacetime economy makes it more difficult
to find talented recruits; or, as is arguably the case in 2004, multiple
commitments around the globe are taxing some branches of the
military to capacity36), conservative legislators might see greater
appeal in a policy that finds a way to include gay citizens in the
military.37 Indeed, between 1999 and 2004, DADT caused the armed
forces to discharge nearly 1,000 service members who possessed
special skills needed in Iraq;· an inclusive command might have
provided a way to retain those members.38 The fact that the exclusive
command offers some soldiers a way to decrease their probability of

35. See Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts: What the Right to Bear Arms Really Means,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1999, at 24. Professor Amar argues for universal, "compul
sory or quasi-compulsory national service, with both military and nonmilitary alternatives."
Id. at 26.
36. See Eric Schmitt, Other Services Eyed by Army for Recruiting, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2004, at Al.
37. See Nathaniel Frank, Why We Need Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003,
at A43 (eliminating the ban on openly gay service members would promote national security
and military readiness).
38. See Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Univ. of
Cal., Santa Barbara, Mission-Critical Specialists Discharged For Homosexuality: New Data
Reveal Extensive Talent Loss Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell (June 21, 2004), at http:l/www.
gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press_rel_2004_0621.htm.
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serving with gays only adds to the appeal for socially conservative
legislators. At the very least, the inclusive command could give
conservative legislators who support a strong national defense a way
to trade off the benefits of a potentially larger, stronger military
against the "moral values" that would otherwise lead them to oppose
any expansion in gay rights.
Initially, one might suspect that liberals would be against an
inclusive command because it doesn't go far enough in eliminating
DADT, while implicitly condoning and legitimizing anti-gay sentiment
by making it the basis for a new exclusive command. However, when
framed as part of a broader goal (the move from stage I, to stage II, to
full integration) liberals should accept the program, if only as
necessary data gathering to support their position.39
III. HISTORICAL PARALLELS
The foregoing arguments for incremental progress are likely to be
offensive to readers impatient for a simple regime of non
discrimination. We share this impatience. But it is useful to remember
that neither racial integration of our schools nor of the military
occurred in one fell swoop. Instead, various intermediate forms of
(admittedly discriminatory) inclusion were important precursors to the
ultimate mandate of integration. This section reminds us of these
histories to make more plausible the idea that intermediate steps of
the kind suggested in our proposal might be a necessary evil.
The history of racial integration of public education might, in
stylized fashion, be broken into four core stages: exclusion, segregated
inclusion, voluntary integration, and mandatory integration. In the
exclusion stage, African-American children in the United States were
at first denied the right to education. The country then moved to a
system of segregated inclusion, the sort of "separate but equal" regime
found constitutional in Plessy v. Furgeson.40 African-American
children were permitted to go to school, but only to schools designated
specifically for them. White children continued to attend schools that
were exclusively white.

39. Indeed, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) heard Jennifer describe the idea at a
conference and was so taken with it that he asked for a written description. Frank seems to
be a great believer in pragmatic incrementalism, though, so perhaps he would take to the
idea more easily than the average liberal politician.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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TABLE 2: STYLIZED STAGES OF INTEGRATION
RACE IN
RACE IN
CORE STAGE
MILITARY
EDUCATION
EXCLUSION

SEGREGATED
INCLUSION
VOLUNTARY
INTEGRATION

MANDATORY
INTEGRATION

AfricanAmerican
children denied
right to
education
"Separate but
equal" schools
"Freedom of
choice"
Whites have
option of
busing to black
schools
White suburbs
have option of
accepting black
students from
urban areas
Nominal
holding of
Brown v. Board
of Education

AfricanAmericans
denied the
right to serve

(Vol. 103:150

SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
IN MILITARY
Homosexual
exclusion policy

Segregated
units
Never used

Never used

Integration
order by
Truman

Long-range goal

Proposed
inclusive
commands

The crucial phase in any process of integration, well illustrated in
the educational context, is mandatory integration. The U.S. Supreme
Court's holdings in Brown v. Board of Education,41 followed by the
remedial cases in which integration plans were approved and imposed
"with all deliberate speed,''42 represent this mandatory stage. The
Court's nominal holding in Brown v. Board of Education43 was to
rej ect Plessy's segregated education system. In most cases, Brown was
followed by either continued segregation or by various attempts to
desegregate through voluntary action. Voluntary integration strategies
have provided opportunities, in some areas, for school districts and the
families within them to integrate proactively, through their own

41. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
42. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301. For examples of such remedial plans, see Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. , 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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exercise of choice; these choices were made in the shadow of a
mandatory norm.
This Essay proposes an inclusive command strategy as an
alternative to sweeping judicial reform analogous to Brown. This
raises an important empirical question as to whether voluntary
integration can succeed without a Brown-like Supreme Court ruling. It
may be that other important actors, such as Congress {by virtue of
amending the DADT policy, at least with respect to the inclusive
command) or important military figures (such as H. Norman
Schwartzkopf or Colin Powell, expressing support for the inclusive
command) could similarly shift the background norms toward
integration of sexual minorities.44
Although most school districts skipped the voluntary integration
stage, we can find some examples of it. It is important to acknowledge
that voluntary integration almost always followed, rather than
preceded, the articulation of an overarching norm of desegregation.
To have any chance of success, voluntary integration strategies may
require a prior statement, such as that in Brown, making clear that
norms have changed. In practice, voluntary systems have been used to
"ease in" the application of a court-imposed desegregation order. In
theory, however, voluntary systems could precede the articulation of a
mandatory norm. In the shadow of Brown, some localities adopted so
called "freedom of choice" plans, which gave white and black families
the option of participating in the integration of the schools. Because it
was understood that white students would not opt to attend
predominantly black schools and black students would be intimidated
and pressured not to attend predominantly white schools, the
"freedom of choice" plans were used by Southern school districts as a
tool of resistance to court-imposed integration orders.45 Although the
U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down "freedom of choice"
plans when other methods, such as rezoning, could more quickly
achieve the ends of desegregation, the Court suggested that the
concept could - at least in theory - be used to integrate schools
fairly.46
44. Such "norm entrepreneurs" can have dramatic effects on shared understandings of
social meaning. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 929 (1996) (discussing how "norm entrepreneurs" can affect public discourse and,
therefore, the shape of social norms).
45. Cf CONSTANCE CURRY, SILVER RIGHTS: THE STORY OF THE CARTER FAMILY'S
BRAVE DECISION TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO AN ALL-WHITE SCHOOL AND CLAIM
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 29 (1995) (recounting the oral history of an African-American family
who took advantage of "freedom of choice" policy and sent seven school-age children to a
formerly all-white school, despite intense harassment and intimidation).
46. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down a "freedom of
choice" plan when three years after implementation no white child had chosen to go to the
formerly black school, and 85% of county's black students remained in that school).
Regarding such plans generally, the Court stated, "If the means prove effective, it is
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Volunteerism is still alive and well today as a dominant tool of
desegregation. Several desegregation plans ask whether suburban
school districts would volunteer to accept students who would be
bused out from predominantly black urban districts.47 A strategy
employing elements of volunteerism can be found in ever-popular
magnet schools. Majority and minority families have the option of
registering for such schools, and school districts attempt to lure a
racially mixed group of students to these schools by offering special
programs and resources there. Instead of mandated busing, the
preference is for voluntary integration.
The history of racial (and sexual)48 integration of the military is
also partially analogous. As before, we did not move simply from a
regime of exclusion to one of mandatory integration. As in the
educational context, African-Americans were officially excluded from
service at various points in our nation's history.49
acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end."
Id. at 440 (citation omitted). See also Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 627 F. Supp. 837 (D. Md.
1985) (Prince George's County); Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (Cincinnati); Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir. 1983) (Little Rock);
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917, 924-26 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Chicago); Flax
v. Potts, 567 F. Supp. 859, 874 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (Fort Worth); United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 679 F.2d 1104, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (Port Arthur); Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp.
1133, 1139 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (Buffalo); Smiley v. Voller!, 453 F. Supp. 463, 476 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (Galveston), modified sub nom., Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1263 (S.D. Tex.
1981).
47. An en bane Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a consent decree containing
an interdistrict transfer provision in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Liddell v. Missouri, 731
F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984). Other courts have commented
generally on the advantages of interdistrict transfer arrangements as something states and
suburbs might undertake voluntarily. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 488 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch.
Dist., 778 F.2d 404, 436 (8th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 22224 (5th Cir. 1983); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 698 F.2d 813, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1983); Paul Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
728, 781 n.179 (1986) (emphasizing the practical impact of Liddell, noting that by 1986
approximately 7,000 black students had transferred from St. Louis schools to suburban
schools, about one-fourth of the students who were attending all-black schools in St. Louis,
and about 540 white suburban students had transferred to St. Louis schools).
48. Women served in the armed forces only as nurses until World War II, when they
began serving in various auxiliary corps. Charles C. Moskos, From Citizen's Army to Social
Laboratory, 17 WILSON Q. 90 (Winter 1993). The auxiliary corps were sex-segregated in
their barracks and for purposes of administration and promotion, but they went to work with
men in regular units. In this sense they enjoyed greater integration than African-American
soldiers in the time of race-segregated units. Women served primarily in administrative,
clerical, and health-care positions until 1973, when the abolition of the draft created some
scarcity in personnel. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 343 (1997). In 1978, women's integration in the military gained
further ground when Congress eliminated the separate women's auxiliary corps, permitting
women to join all branches of the military and fill all roles save those involved in direct
combat. See id. at 346.
49. Like gay men and lesbians, African-Americans have always fought for this country
(including the war for independence, before this country was a country). SHILTS, supra note
13, at 7 ("Even before the armed forces of the United States were formally organized, gays
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The objections to racial integration of the armed forces bear
striking similarity to the anti-gay rhetoric that currently supports the
ban on gays in the military.5° For example, in the Civil War, some
Union generals "feared that the presence of black soldiers in the army
would create disharmony and drive away white volunteers. "51 In 1940,
Admiral W.R. Sexton wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that if
"colored men" served in the Navy, "team work, harmony, and ship
efficiency (would be] seriously handicapped" because of the attitudes
of white sailors.52 As late as 1971, Lieutenant General Edward
Almond wrote that racial integration "weakens" the "efficiency" of
the armed forces.53 As in the case of homosexuality, unit cohesion
served as a general objection to the integration of the service by race.
From nominal exclusion we moved (as in education) to a regime of
segregated inclusion. After the Emancipation Proclamation, black
men were officially allowed to enlist in the Union army during the
Civil War as part of the "United States Colored Troops."54 Four black
units fought in the Indian wars of 1870-90, and black soldiers also
fought in Cuba, where they rode with Teddy Roosevelt as part of the
Rough Riders.55 Racial segregation within the army continued during
World War I and at the start of World War Il.56

were bearing arms for the yet unborn nation."). Initially, black enlistments were officially
forbidden by order of the Council of Generals. John Sibley Butler, Race Relations in the
Military, in THE MILITARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB? 118 (Charles C. Moskos & Frank R.
Wood eds. 1988). The British offered the black men freedom if they would join the British
ranks. In response, General George Washington told the Continental Congress that he
would enlist black men notwithstanding the official prohibition, and this resulted in over five
thousand black men serving the Colonial side in the Revolutionary War. Id. Black men were
allowed to fight and die for this country's independence, but when the fighting ended they
were excluded from any ongoing participation within military institutions. Id.
50. Many high-ranking military officials acknowledge but explicitly refuse to entertain
parallels between sexual orientation and race. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin
Powell, a retired four-star general, has said that "as an African-American," he is "well aware
of the attempts to draw parallels between" the military's stance on homosexuality "and
positions used years ago to deny opportunities to African-Americans." He says, however,
that "[s]kin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the
most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient
but invalid argument." 139 CONG. REC. 2210 (1993) (letter of May 8, 1992, from Colin L.
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Rep. Patricia Schroeder).
51. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 502 (1991).
52.

ESKRIDGE & HUNTER,

supra note 48, at 332.

53. Id.
54. Butler, supra note 49, at 118. As had happened earlier with the Revolutionary War,
when the fighting ended in the Civil War, black men were again excluded from ongoing
participation in the military.
55. Id.
56. The Army set a maximum quota for black soldiers to correspond with the propor
tion of the general population that was black. The number of African-Americans in the ser
vice never approached this maximum, reaching 5.9% on the eve of Pearl Harbor and, at its
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But unlike education, the military moved directly from segregated
inclusion to mandatory integration. When the U.S. suffered a shortage
of combat personnel during WWII, platoons of black soldiers were
ordered to serve in previously all-white companies, but this was not by
choice of the black or white soldiers. This experimental combination
was instead a move to mandatory integration, made complete with
President Truman's Executive Order of 1948 officially outlawing
segregation in the U.S. military.57 By the time the U.S. fought in
Korea, black and white soldiers fought side by side without incident.58
Stepping back, we see that racial integration of the military was
incremental, but it bypassed the voluntary integration stage that has
been much more present in the evolution of educational integration.
So the natural question arises whether voluntary integration is needed
with regard to sexual orientation. If this stage could be bypassed with
regard to race (and sex), maybe it could be bypassed with regard to
sexual orientation as well.
Our answer is that the voluntary integration stage with regard to
race might have been less needed because the military went through a
stage of segregated inclusion that had sufficiently demonstrated the
competence and valor of African-American soldiers. But if this is so,
shouldn't we instead be embracing segregated integration (instead of
voluntary integration) as the intermediate step to full integration?
The problem here is that segregated integration of gays and
lesbians (even if we wanted it) is really not feasible. The idea of
segregated inclusion for gays and lesbians would mean "gay-only"
units which would parallel the "black-only" or "women-only" units of
the past. As a practical matter, the military does not have the option of

highest during WWII, topping out at about 10% of total personnel. CHARLES C. MOSKOS,
THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: THE RANK AND FILE IN TODAY'S MILITARY 109-10
(1970). The black units were usually used for heavy-duty labor and not combat. Id. at 110.
57. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).
58. The history of racial integration in the other branches varied slightly from that of the
Army. In 1 947, when the Air Force was established as separate from the Army, it began its
own movements toward racial integration, and by 1950 the Air Force was largely integrated.
In the Navy, black sailors served during the Civil War, but in the early twentieth century
restrictions were imposed on their service, and by 1 920 all black men were barred from
enlisting. In 1932, black men were permitted to join the Navy as stewards in the messman's
branch, and in 1942, some general service openings were allowed in segregated harbor and
shore assignments. In 1 944, the Navy took initial steps toward integration by assigning a
small number of black men to general service on an ocean-going vessel. After WWII, the
Navy took major steps toward integration, but even in 1970, African-Americans accounted
for only 4 to 5% of total Navy personnel. See MOSKOS, supra note 56, at 1 12-13. By 1995,
African-Americans constituted roughly 1 7% of Navy personnel. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 374 (1 999) (Table 587: Department of
Defense Manpower: 1 950 to 1997). In the Marine Corps, policy evolved from total exclusion
of African-Americans before WWII, to segregated units of "heavy-duty laborers,
ammunition handlers, and anti-aircraft gunners" in 1942, to full integration in 1949-50.
MOSKOS, supra note 56, at 1 1 3.
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using a segregated inclusion strategy, because gay men and lesbians
have the option of remaining in the closet and thereby "passing" as
heterosexual people.59 This passing strategy is generally not available
to women or people of color. The closeting option means that any
attempt to (exclude or) segregate on the basis of sexual orientation in
an absolute sense is bound to fail.60
The difficulty of passing in the context of race and the relative ease
of doing so with orientation means that segregated inclusion could
progress toward mandatory integration more effectively in the context
of race than orientation. While black soldiers were able (actually
required) to be "openly" black and simultaneously to demonstrate
their abilities as soldiers, gay and lesbian soldiers have never had this
opportunity. As soon as a soldier's orientation is known by her
superiors, her resulting separation from the military prevents her from
serving while openly gay. As Kenji Yoshino explains:
[T]he military has been careful to rely on stereotypes that gays cannot

disprove through infiltration. Because these stereotypes rely on what
"open" or visible homosexuals will do to a unit, an invisible homosexual
cannot, by definition, disprove the stereotype until she comes out of the

closet. At that point, of course, she is generally removed from the

military and the stereotype remains largely uncontested.61

Thus, while racial integration could move directly from segregated
inclusion to mandatory integration, the integration of sexual
minorities may have to proceed with a different intermediate step to
counter the effects of the closet. Voluntary integration suggests itself
as a candidate in part because of the important role it has played and
continues to play in the integration of public education.
Our inclusive command proposal in essence is suggesting that the
military use voluntary integration as a substitute for segregated
inclusion as the core intermediate step, a step the military was able to
skip in the context of race. The voluntary integration stage, as the
name suggests, permits every participant to choose, fully informed and
free of coercion, whether to join or avoid the integrated group.
The history of racial and sexual integration suggests that potential
demonstration effects of any system that creates segregated groups are
not just hypothetical. For example, in 1977, the Army conducted a
59. As Kenji Yoshino has argued, however, in the military context this invisibility option
is disempowering rather than helpful to gay and lesbian soldiers. See Yoshino, supra note 18,
at 544 (noting that DADT simultaneously dampens the empowering aspects and amplifies
the disempowering aspects of gay invisibility).
60. Perhaps the closest analog to segregated inclusion applicable to sexual orientation is
the DADT policy currently in force. Just as segregated inclusion permitted the military to
insulate white soldiers from the perceived threat or disruption of racial integration, so too
DADT allows the military to include gay men and lesbians while at the same time shielding
heterosexual soldiers from the knowledge that any given individual is gay.
61. Yoshino, supra note 18, at 554.
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series of experiments to determine at what level of participation (035 % ) women would lower unit performance in combat and non
combat contexts. The Army found that women's participation had no
adverse affect on unit performance, at least up to the 35% level
tested.62 This same spirit of experimentation could be applied to test
the relative performance of the inclusive and exclusive commands in
both stages I and II.
The volunteerism of the inclusive command mobilizes the power of
heterosexual allies - forcing them to decide whether they prefer to
stand with the intolerant or the tolerant. Some heterosexuals might
prefer not to make this choice, but when confronted with the decision,
many - like the jurors in Twelve Angry Men - will step away from
the table of bigotry.
The inclusive command strategy admittedly treats integration of
the forces as an incremental process. It permits some service members
to keep themselves apart (or, under the "don't ask, don't tell" policy,
to persuade themselves that they are staying apart) from people they
dislike. Such a system of separation would not offer a satisfying end
point for any attempt to integrate gay and lesbian soldiers into the
Military. But one of the central qualities of the inclusive command
strategy is that it is a dynamic rather than static proposal - a means to
an end rather than a goal in itself. Creating separate spaces (based
upon the level of openness about homosexuality and people's
preferences for that) can contribute to the overarching goal of
ultimate, undifferentiated integration of the armed forces by sexual
minorities.
Granted, inclusive commands might begin as much smaller entities
than exclusive commands. As homosexuality gains growing acceptance
in our society, however, the number of people opting for inclusive
commands should increase. Over time, exclusive commands might
shrink, eventually becoming a sort of vestigial organ, so dispensable
that the costs of maintaining separate facilities would outweigh the
military benefits. At that point, soldiers with the real "problem" - an
inability or unwillingness to serve with fellow soldiers who are openly
gay - would be subject to exclusion. In this dynamic version of
integration strategy, the stigma eventually falls on soldiers who are
prejudiced rather than those who are gay. This in turn might create
incentives for soldiers to rid themselves of their prejudices, or at least
put those prejudices aside when it is time to serve their country.

62. MAJ. GEN. JEANNE HOLM, USAF (RET.), WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 257-58 (rev. ed., Presidio Press 1992) (1982); ESKRIDGE &
HUNTER, supra note 48, at 345-46.
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND
The foregoing analysis lays out the theoretical arguments for
adopting the self-segregation of the inclusive command. But we did
not delve into the details of implementation and a host of nitty-gritty
inquiries: What should be the wording of the questions asked? What
precisely should turn on the answers? Can the military effectively
function with both inclusive and exclusive commands? And finally,
will anyone actually opt for the inclusive command? It is to these
practical questions that we now turn. In essence, we hope to have
already convinced you that the idea has appeal. Here we try to answer
the question: will it actually work?
A. What Questions Should Be Asked?
There are many different ways to frame the basic questions in
stages I and II. And, as in other contexts, the framing can have
important impacts on the way that people would respond. In stage I,
we have suggested that the self-sorting question be phrased:
Would you prefer to serve in a command without any gay
personnel?
But we might have framed the question in the affirmative instead:
"Would you be willing to serve in a command with gay personnel?"
Or "Would you volunteer to serve in a command with gay personnel?"
These different phrases might tease out different levels of support.
Some soldiers who wouldn't "volunteer" to serve with gays might
nevertheless "be willing" to serve if asked. Many soldiers simply might
not care whether their colleagues are gay or not. We have chosen to
frame the question in the negative - as a way of partitioning those
who have an affirmative desire to avoid gay colleagues from those who
are merely neutral. We predict that soldiers who don't care or don't
have a problem with gays will answer this question "no," and be
channeled into the inclusive command.
One might argue that the phrasing will have little effect on the
answers, because the soldiers will quickly see through the question and
focus on what turns on it - whether they will be assigned to the
inclusive or exclusive command. By this argument, the question itself
becomes irrelevant, and you might as easily base assignments on the
question, "Is the moon made of cheese?" But from the perspective of
an individual soldier, what turns on her answer is importantly
determined by how other soldiers answer the question. A soldier's
perception of how many other soldiers are neutral about gay
personnel versus how many affirmatively desire to serve alongside
gays is likely quite different. Framing the question differently is likely
to produce different focal points. We have chosen a frame that
attempts to channel the truly intolerant toward the exclusive
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command, while channeling the tolerant and the indifferent toward
the inclusive.
We have also considered whether the question should expressly
respond to potential "tipping" anxiety of heterosexual soldiers. Some
soldiers might be willing to serve in an inclusive command, but only if
the proportion of the unit that is gay remained below a certain level.
Even if heterosexual soldiers responded in the abstract that they were
willing to serve with openly gay people, in actual practice they might
feel differently. Each soldier might have a "tipping point" beyond
which his enthusiasm for an inclusive command would wane.
For example, while some heterosexual soldiers would be happy to
serve in a command where 10% of the soldiers were openly gay, they
might be less comfortable in a command where 75% of the soldiers
were gay. This could be true for a number of reasons. In the 75%
command, heterosexual soldiers might fear that the ambiguity of the
inclusive command would be reduced, and that observers would
assume that any given individual within the unit is gay. Other
heterosexual soldiers might worry that the atmosphere of the
command would change somehow if the percentage of the unit that
was gay exceeded a certain point. Between 10 and 75 % , however, the
tipping point is unclear. At what point would the proportion of gay
soldiers in the unit become so large that no heterosexual soldiers
would wish to remain in the unit, thus rendering it a "gay command"
rather than an "inclusive" one? Even heterosexuals who genuinely
support gay rights might still avoid patronizing gay bars or vacationing
in certain sections of Fire Island.
This tipping anxiety is of course related to the challenge of
ambiguation. Some heterosexuals might be comfortable with letting
their audience entertain the possibility that there is a 5% chance that
they are gay, but would become very uncomfortable if the audience
thought there was a 50% chance that they were gay. This tipping
anxiety was vividly displayed on a plane trip we took to Boston. By
chance, the flight included several dozen members of the New York
City Gay Men's Chorus. The heterosexual men on the flight were in
the minority and some seemed to go to unusual conversational lengths
to disambiguate themselves.
Collective action problems of this type could make it difficult to
form a truly inclusive command from the very outset; heterosexual
soldiers might be unwilling to opt for this command unless they felt
assured that a significant number of other heterosexual soldiers would
do the same. Just as we might ask the maximum percentage of the
command that could be gay within an integrated unit before tipping
would occur, so too we could ask the minimum percentage that would
have to be heterosexual in order to get it off the ground.
In stage I, the tipping problem might be suppressed because
soldiers would be much less aware of the percentage of the command
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that is gay. The tipping problem in stage I might also relate to the size
of the inclusive command. Especially early in the experiment, there
may be fear among heterosexual soldiers that low total participation in
the inclusive command will result in the assumption that only gay
soldiers opted in. Thus, in stage I, total participation in the inclusive
command will act as a proxy for what percentage of each command is
gay, since that factor is unknown. Heterosexual service members may
be hesitant to join an inclusive command unless the total participation
in such commands comprises a substantial percentage of the military.
This would combat the presumption that all the members are gay
because there would just be too many. Many service members may
assume that approximately 10% (the highest, but also most popular
estimate) of the population is gay. The exact percentage of the
military that is gay or lesbian is unknown.63 But if 20% of recruits
joined the inclusive command, fears may be assuaged. This doesn't
contradict the idea that every soldier has a specific theoretical tipping
point. However, even if a particular soldier's theoretical tipping point
were exceeded by the actual number of gay people in the command,
he would not know this and thus would not engage in the "straight
flight" that would cause the tipping to occur. On the other hand, the
very fact that a soldier has a tipping point and cannot know when it
has been exceeded might cause him to avoid the inclusive command
altogether. Thus, the inability to measure the percentage of the
command that is gay does not necessarily help the inclusive command
to recruit heterosexual soldiers. What starts as a tipping problem
becomes a recruitment problem - we don't have to worry about
heterosexual soldiers tipping out of the command if they won't join it
to begin with.
Some recruits might prefer to qualify their willingness to serve in
the inclusive command by indicating that if the percentage of gay
people exceeded a certain level (10%; 35% ; 50% , for example), they
would prefer the exclusive command. To these people, the military
could offer conditional membership in the inclusive command; soldiers
could specify their tipping point and would be free to transfer to the
exclusive command if the number of gay people in the inclusive
command exceeded their disclosed tipping point. However, a cascade
effect might occur in such a system: when individuals at the 10% point
are allowed to transfer, the command may as a result reach 35 % gay,
allowing more service members to transfer.

63. Some evidence suggests that gay men are equally represented, and lesbians
overrepresented, in the military as compared to their numbers in the general population. See
THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEF. PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH
AND EDUC. CfR., NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY

at C-5 (1988); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy:
Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992).
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Moreover, this approach would be difficult to implement, because
the stage I screening mechanisms proposed thus far do not ask (and
under DADT cannot ask) about soldiers' sexual orientations, only
their preferences with respect to the sexual orientations of their peers.
Without a separate question that seeks to discover soldiers' sexual
orientations, military officials could not know who was gay, making it
impossible to tell when the maximum gay percentage had been
reached.
For information gathering purposes, then, the army could
administer an anonymous survey, asking each recruit to state his or
her sexual orientation. Two problems immediately arise with such a
survey: accuracy and legality. The results from any such survey might
be wildly inaccurate. Promises of anonymity are often insufficient to
induce truthful answers to questions about homosexuality. And
directly asking the question would violate the "don't ask" portion
of DADT.
But the army might get a more accurate count of gay and lesbian
soldiers if it used a "randomized response" approach, in which
respondents are instructed to privately flip a coin. If it is heads, they
answer the question "Are you gay" truthfully; if it is tails, they answer
the question "yes" no matter what the truth is. A "yes," in other
words, does not require respondents to reveal anything about
themselves, because only the individual soldier knows the result of the
coin flip. But if 53 % of 1000 respondents should answer yes, the
military would have a good idea that 6 % of the group was gay.64 This
randomization preserves anonymity by giving the "yes" responders
plausible deniability, but allows researchers to estimate the proportion
of gays in the aggregate.65

64. In a 1991 study by Overlooked Opinions designed to discover the percentage of gay
men who had tested HIV positive, researchers used both direct techniques (direct questions
with promises of anonymity) and randomized response techniques. Of the respondents who
were surveyed using direct methods, 4% said they were HIV positive. Of those surveyed
using randomized response techniques, 11 % said they were HIV positive. Press Release,
Overlooked Opinions, Inc., Apples and Oranges [hereinafter Apples and Oranges] (on file
with author).
65. Unfortunately, some researchers have found that respondents' aversion to
homosexuality is so strong that they will even disobey instructions in order to avoid
answering "yes" to a question about homosexual activity. In one study, the coin flip was
actually observed by hidden camera, and 26% of respondents instructed to answer "yes" to
the question "have you ever had a homosexual experience" disregarded the coin flip and
answered "no." Apples and Oranges, supra note 64 (discussing survey methodologies and
the variations in reported numbers of homosexuals). Such disregard for the instructions
would cause the survey to underreport the number of respondents who were gay. A second
problem with such a survey is that it might violate both the "don't ask" and "don't tell"
portions of DADT. But to our minds, the randomization of the coin-flipping mechanism
avoids a legal problem because the military does not solicit identifiable information about
individual service members' sexual orientation.
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If this coin-flipping survey revealed that the number of gay people
in the inclusive command had exceeded the tipping points of some
members, then the army even in stage I could respond to "tipping"
anxiety. It could offer transfers to soldiers who had expressed a
discomfort with serving with too many gays. In this way, the army
would manage tipping by keeping track of aggregate numbers; and it
would not be necessary to know the orientation of any given soldier.66
Ultimately, we reject the idea of soliciting detailed discriminatory
preferences from the troops, because it might tend to reify and
reinforce the very preferences we are trying to obliterate. The military
should take seriously the risk that "straight flight" will turn the
inclusive command de facto into a segregated gay commancl But the
solution to the tipping problem is found in effective training, not
catering to homophobia. Prior to assignment, every recruit could
complete an information-rich training program which would describe
the inclusive command. In this training program, recruits would learn
that DADT's prohibition on asking about service members' sexual
orientation prevents military officials from knowing ex ante the
proportion of any command - inclusive or exclusive - that is actually
gay or lesbian. Indeed, the military might consider posing the sorting
questions to recruits after they have completed basic training, where
the military already stresses unity and tolerance for difference.
Recruits who opt for an inclusive command in stage I would accept
that assignment on the premise that DADT would prevent gay and
lesbian members of the command from identifying themselves. In
stage II, recruits would join the inclusive command knowing that some
of their fellow service members might come out as gay or lesbian.
With time and effective training, it is possible that many heterosexual
soldiers would internally adjust their tipping point upward.
B.

What Should Turn on the Answers?

Arguably, the assignment given to a soldier who says he is willing
to serve with gay people should have no special label at all; it should
just be "the army." This complete integration is the ultimate goal of
the inclusive command approach. As a first step, however, giving
labels to the two different commands can help create the appropriate
focal point for self-segregation of the tolerant and intolerant. Naming

66. In stage II, the army might try to manage tipping more directly by imposing a quota
on the number of openly gay soldiers that were assigned to particular inclusive commands.
But quotas are unlikely to be effective, because gay and lesbian soldiers could closet
themselves in order to gain admission to the inclusive unit. And quotas would expose gay
and lesbian soldiers to a new type of discrimination that ultimately rests on the
discriminatory preferences of their colleagues, partially negating the goal of the inclusive
command.
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the two commands is problematic, however. It could prove difficult to
find word pairs that avoid any connotation of hierarchy or stigma.
But we should pause to consider whether the military should
stigmatize those soldiers who opt for the exclusive command.
Identifying and stigmatizing bigots is a worthy goal for reasons besides
the recognition of gay rights. Research on anti-Semitism shows that
people who express prejudice on the basis of one characteristic (such
as religion) are likely to express prejudice on the basis of other
characteristics as well (such as race or national origin).67 In an
organization that relies upon soldiers' ability to work together and
defend each other, prejudice can be costly. A soldier who is willing to
express prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation may also be
harboring prejudice on the basis of race or religion, not so willingly
expressed (because such prejudices are less socially acceptable than
homophobia). Soldiers who opt for the exclusive command might be
inadvertently signaling an inability to work not only with openly gay
people, but with people of diverse races, religions, or ethnic
backgrounds as well. Soldiers who join an inclusive command, on the
other hand - particularly heterosexual soldiers who do so - might in
general be more tolerant of and receptive to differences within the
ranks. This receptivity could foster greater unity in an already diverse
military force.
There is, however, a serious risk attendant to any stigmatization of
the exclusive command. Social attitudes, like sexual orientation, can
be masked. If soldiers join an inclusive command not because they are
comfortable serving with gay people, but because they wish to avoid
the negative aspects of the alternative command, then some soldiers
with anti-gay prejudice (people we might call "closeted bigots") could
end up in an inclusive command. These closeted bigots could be bad
for unit cohesion in the inclusive command. In stage I, although
DADT would prevent them from identifying gay or lesbian soldiers
with certainty, they could nonetheless decrease morale by making
derogatory remarks about gay men and lesbians. In stage II, in
addition to harassing the soldiers who came out, the closeted bigots
might seek somehow to pit heterosexual soldiers against openly gay
soldiers within an inclusive command. If the inclusive command is to
have its desired demonstration effect, then soldiers who are likely to
display or foment anti-gay prejudice should be discouraged from
joining it. Stigmatizing the exclusive command could drive some
soldiers to an inclusive command who are not really "qualified" to join
it. In this sense, the inclusive command has its own exclusive qualities,
because it bars people who express anti-gay sentiment.
67. See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science
Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 313 (2000).
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If we wish to avoid stigmatizing either of the commands, we should
devise names that are parallel and politically neutral. But this could
prove difficuJt. If the command admitting openly gay people is
"inclusive," is the other command "exclusive"? The word exclusive
sometimes connotes a kind of elitism or superiority. But other word
pairs - "tolerant"/"intolerant"; "may ask, may tell"/"don't ask,
don't tell", etc. - are also value laden. Labeling the divisions by
number does not solve the problem, because the lower number will
inevitably communicate priority or hierarchy. To avoid these
problems, we could choose labels that are not descriptive in any real
sense, such as animals ("cougar" command/"tiger" command) or
colors ("green" unit/"red" unit).
And for parallel reasons, the substantive assignments and career
opportunities of soldiers who opt for the exclusive command should
not be impaired. The military should resist the urge to statistically
discriminate against these intolerant soldiers, again because such
discrimination is likely to cause them to suppress their true feelings. A
reverse tipping problem in which all soldiers opted for the inclusive
command in stage I would not be an improvement over the current
system. Of course, at some level it will be difficult to avoid the
politicization of choice. Just as judicial nominees are judged on their
decisions to join restrictive clubs, candidates for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff one day would likely be judged on whether they preferred to
associate with the intolerant. The point here is that the military should
to the extent practicable reduce and disconnect the career and social
consequences of opting for one command or the other. Over time, any
word that we give to the exclusive command is likely to become
tainted by repeated connection to its unworthy substance. But the
mechanism should at least begin by putting the commands on an equal
and neutral footing.
Whatever the name attached to the inclusive command, it should
be integrated rather than exclusively gay. Creating a "gay ghetto"
within the military could more severely stigmatize the soldiers who
join this unit, singling out the people who are not the sole or even the
primary cause of the problems surrounding sexuality and the military.
Given the hostility many feel toward homosexuality, a command that
was exclusively gay could be vulnerable to hostile reactions from
soldiers outside the unit, reactions that could range from a general
lack of support to "fragging," in which service members fire on their
own people with malicious motive.68 The presence of heterosexual
soldiers within an inclusive command would help to dilute this effect,
insulating gay and lesbian soldiers from the negative reactions they
would likely engender in some fellow soldiers outside the unit.
68. The term "fragging" was popularized during the Vietnam War, when enlisted men
would occasionally fire on their own junior officers.

Michigan Law Review

180

(Vol. 103:150

In her defense of the ban on gays in the military, Melissa Wells
Petry argues that grouping or segregating soldiers by certain behaviors
can be detrimental to their relationships with fellow soldiers:
This phenomenon already is observed in military culture when soldiers

are grouped - in social not official terms _..:. by behavior, or potential

behavior, that is considered substandard for soldiering. These groups of

soldiers frequently become a focal point for reinforcing the military

identity of the larger group. . . .
Desirable or not, this social phenomenon is a reaffirmation of the

larger

group's

identity as

" real"

soldiers. Nevertheless, this

social

phenomenon clearly can go too far and result in divisiveness. Controlling
this natural social phenomenon would be more difficult if soldiers were
grouped by non-military behavior as a matter of official policy.69

The inclusive command system would group soldiers by their
expressed willingness to serve with openly gay colleagues. This
willingness would not be, in Wells-Petry's words, "non-military" or
"substandard" behavior, but rather would be crucially tied to work as
members of the armed services.
At this point it is important to remember the important role
commanding officers can play in implementing strategies like the
inclusive command. One might even enlist the support of "norm
entrepreneurs" such as H. Norman Schwartzkopf, Wesley Clark, or
Colin Powell. They might make clear that if they were called upon to
answer the key question, simply on their own behalf, they would
indicate a willingness to serve with gay and lesbian service members.
Indeed, given their praise of gay and lesbian former service members,
Schwartzkopf and Powell could likely express this personal view
without contradicting their 1990's Congressional testimony on unit
cohesion. If norm entrepreneurs were able to endorse the inclusive
command as a good thing, such statements might play a role analogous
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Brown, creating an
environment conducive to voluntary integration efforts.
But even if the problems of tipping and stigma proved so
intractable that the inclusive command became in actuality a gay
command, we needn't conclude that the experiment has failed.
Instead, we might see the gay command as an interim step (stage I.a.,
perhaps) toward an integrated inclusive command (probably renamed,
in order to disrupt the signal that "inclusive" "gay"), which in turn
would be an interim step toward full integration. The process of
integrating gay and lesbian soldiers would be broken into smaller
increments, but the cause of gay rights would nonetheless move
forward.
=

69. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 169-70.
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Administrative Burdens

The inclusive command system this Essay proposes would
admittedly impose on military administrators additional layers of cost
and procedure that could prove onerous. First, we must acknowledge
the additional costs if the military attempted to implement an inclusive
command system by creating two duplicative sets of resources - one
for each type of command. The costs of keeping the inclusive and
exclusive commands separate but indeed equal could be prohibitive.
The greater the administrative burden created by a dual-command
system, the more difficult it becomes for the army to meet other
demands on commanders' time and energy. The very process of
determining the appropriate command for a new soldier, for example,
would consume precious resources. If soldiers retained the option of
moving from exclusive to inclusive commands (or vice versa), this too
could impose additional administrative costs. While soldiers are
trained to be flexible, able to adapt to new conditions and
requirements, it is also a hallmark of military training that strong
emphasis is placed on esprit de corps. Undue movement of personnel
from one command to another could jeopardize unit cohesion in ways
that a few openly gay soldiers staying in one place never would.
Military officials might also object that the division of soldiers into
inclusive and exclusive units would be artificial and potentially
temporary. If the soldiers were called to combat, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to maintain the separation of the two units. They
might fight in coordinated or even combined fashion. Experiences of
gay and lesbian soldiers who have served suggest, however, that the
more exigent the circumstances under which soldiers are working, the
less important anyone's sexual orientation seems to be.70 Perhaps at
such times, particularly, unit cohesion turns not on personal
characteristics, but on the extent to which troops can count on each
other to fight effectively and rescue endangered comrades. Not
coincidentally, the military has been willing to overlook members'
homosexuality in order to maximize personnel in times of war.71 As
70. Cal Anderson, Army Specialist-6, recounts, "We were situated about a mile from
the Viet Cong. Being that close to possible death, I think the people were a lot more tolerant
of each other, and most people kind of looked out for each other. There wasn't a lot of fear
of getting caught, exposed, or kicked out of the Army for any particular infraction."
HUMPHREY, supra note 16, at 64. J.W. "Skip" Godsey, a former enlisted man and officer
who served in the Army from 1967-70 and in the Navy from 1970-86, says, "(I]n combat you
didn't really give a fuck what men did and what men didn't do. . . . It didn't make a . . .
difference whether he was black, white, queer, or straight . . . ."). Id. at 210.
71. See SHILTS, supra note 13, at 726-27 (noting that as part of a "stop-loss" policy
designed to reduce discharges from the armed forces and ensure adequate manpower,
reservists who admitted their homosexuality were told by commanders that "they did not
care - the reservists would be mobilized like any other soldier"). But see Lou Chibbaro Jr.,
Navy 'Stop-Loss' Order Bars Gays, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 5, 2001 (on file with author)
(reporting that the U.S. Air Force and Navy had instituted a "stop-loss" policy to limit
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the United States has coordinated peacekeeping efforts with other
members of the United Nations and NATO, moreover, American
troops have worked closely with soldiers from countries that permit
openly gay people to serve.72
In the wake of the rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights requiring Great Britain to include openly gay people in its
military forces,73 such interaction can only increase. Britain has been
the United States' greatest supporter in the war on terrorism declared
in response to the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 ; the UK has also
deployed thousands of troops in Iraq. Not only do gay soldiers serve
this and other countries' interest in staffing at times of crisis, they may
disturb the average heterosexual soldier less at such times than in
peace times. Geoffrey Bateman and Sameera Dalvi studied openly
gay, non-American service members who have served with Americans
in multinational military units or operations. They concluded that U.S.
personnel are able to interact and work successfully with
acknowledged gay personnel from foreign militaries. Institutionally,
they found, "neither NATO nor the United Nations has addressed the
coordination of divergent policies concerning sexual orientation in an
official manner, largely because these organizations are preoccupied
with more pressing concerns, and because homosexual personnel are
not seen as sources of tension, even for U.S. personnel."74 As studies
like Bateman and Dalvi's multiply, military leaders will gain further
assurance that inclusive and exclusive commands could be coordinated
and even combined in times of crisis without sacrificing military
effectiveness.
Although "unit cohesion" is the central rationale now for
excluding openly gay and lesbian citizens from the military,
commanders and commentators have from time to time cited other
administrative rationales for the ban, such as health care costs and
security risks. For example, Melissa Wells-Petry, a strong opponent of
discharges in wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, but that discharges for violations of
DADT would continue).
72. NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., RAND CORP., MR-323-0SD, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 11-12
(1993) [hereinafter RAND].
73. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 & 32377/96, 29 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 548 (1999); Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 & 33986/96,
29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999); see also Philip Britton, Gay and Lesbian Rights in the United
Kingdom: The Story Continued, 10 IND. INT'L & CO MP. L. REV. 207, 233 (2000) (detailing
the court decisions which led to the new British policy of "don't ask, can tell"). Early reports
indicate that the change has not been difficult to implement. See Sarah Lyall, Gays in the
British Military: Ask, Tell and Then Move On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at Al.
74. Geoffrey Bateman & Sameera Dalvi, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities
in the Military, Univ. of Cal., Santa Barbara, Multinational Military Units and
Homosexual Personnel (Feb. 2004), at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/2004_
02_BatemanSameera.htm.
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gays in the military, has devoted many pages to detailed description�
of the "sexual practices" of gay men and lesbians, at least in part75 to
explain why health care costs may be greater for gay service members
than for straight ones. Because she provides no analogously detailed
description of the "sexual practices" of heterosexuals and the medical
conditions resulting from that activity (including pregnancy), she fails
to make the case that health care costs are likely to be particularly or
uniquely high for gay and lesbian soldiers. Even if gay men or lesbians
in the general population are prone to particular health problems, we
lack evidence that gay and lesbian soldiers share these health care
needs. And even if evidence suggested that gay and lesbian service
members had up to now exhibited certain behaviors or health care
needs, it is possible that soldiers in an inclusive unit would be
different.
For example, even if gay soldiers' need for secrecy about their
sexual orientation under DADT has created high stress levels and led
to substance abuse or mental health problems,76 it is possible that gay
soldiers in the inclusive unit, with more support and less at stake in
concealing aspects of their identity, would suffer significantly less
stress and fewer stress-induced health problems.77 Although Wells
Petry cites data suggesting that gay men and lesbians are vulnerable to
certain types of sexually transmitted diseases,78 she cites no evidence
that military gays would contract such diseases at a rate any higher

75. One suspects that another motivation for including this material is to shock or
disgust readers. Some of the information about sexual practices seems fairly irrelevant to the
question of military service. For example, Wells-Petry discusses in detail some rather exotic
sexual habits found in only a small percentage of a select sample of gay men. See WELLS
PETRY, supra note 12, at 101. More common activities she discusses - such as "oral-genital
contact" - are also practiced by heterosexuals, see EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 98-99
tbl.3.6 (1994), but Wells-Petry includes no information about sexually transmitted diseases
among heterosexuals and the sexual practices that help to spread them. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 635 (1999) ("At least
three-quarters of the straight population, including the President of the United States, have
engaged in oral sex (many of them regularly), and almost a fourth have engaged in anal
sex"). No doubt many readers of Wells-Petry's book would also be shocked and disgusted to
read detailed accounts of some heterosexual sex. Cf WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY
OF DISGUST (1997) (describing the disgust heterosexual sex has engendered in many
cultures).
76. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 114 (observing that gay men and lesbians are
likely to suffer stress stemming from "secrecy, disapproval and often internalized shame").
77. This in turn could make these gay and lesbian soldiers even more productive than
they are able to be under the "don't ask, don't tell" regime, where some energy is inevitably
wasted in the effort to maintain the secrecy of their sexual orientation. See HUMPHREY,
supra note 16, at 71 ("[T]hat energy to hide should be channeled in more positive ways. . . .
It's too bad, and the military loses").
78. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 102-10.
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than heterosexuals do within the military.79 Assuming that gay men
and lesbians within the military resemble the gay and lesbian
population generally, or that if allowed to serve openly they would
behave in a manner consistent with studies of certain gay and lesbian
populations, may be unfounded. An inclusive command would permit
gay and lesbian soldiers to demonstrate not only the types of soldiers
they can be, but also the specific costs and benefits which would be
derived from their presence in the military.
The final point to be demonstrated by the inclusive command is
that gay and lesbian soldiers would pose no increased risk to security.
Although in recent years opponents of gays in the military seem to
have abandoned this untenable rationale for exclusion, for some time
common wisdom held that homosexuality made a person vulnerable to
coercion or seduction into espionage activity. Closeted gay men and
lesbians, it was said, would cooperate with hostile governments in
order to protect the secret of their sexual orientation; even people
who were open about their own sexual orientation might be more
vulnerable if they wished to protect the identities of closeted sexual
partners.80 Logic and evidence have proven this theory wrong. As a
matter of logic, the inclusive command would greatly mitigate the
danger that gay or lesbian soldiers would betray their country in order
to protect the secret of their own sexual orientation, because in a stage
II inclusive command, their sexual orientation would already be
generally known or would not be a matter bearing on their careers if it
were revealed.81 The evidence shows that gay men and lesbians are no
more likely to betray their country than heterosexuals are.82
Just as voluntary, incremental integration can solve the "unit
cohesion" problem, so too the inclusive command could demonstrate
that these additional administrative rationales are unfounded. Some
military warnings of increased administrative burdens are empirical
claims unsupported by relevant data. The inclusive command system
79. Similarly, the ability to be open about their partners and significant others might
make it easier for gay and lesbian soldiers to preserve monogamous relationships, thus
reducing extra-curricular sexual activity and consequent vulnerability to sexually transmitted
diseases, something Wells-Petry emphasizes.
80. See SHILTS, supra note 1 3, at 682.
81. We have argued, however, that even in an inclusive command soldiers might be out
to some people but not others. They might be open about their sexual orientation with
coworkers within the military but not, say, with their parents. Thus it is not the case that a
member of an inclusive command has nothing to lose if someone were to threaten publicity
about sexual orientation. Rather, one of the crucially destructive consequences of that
revelation under the current system - discharge, often dishonorable, from the military could not be part of the threat delivered to a soldier in a stage II inclusive command.
82. See Melinda S. Cooper, Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation in Military and
Security Contexts: An Analysis of Recent Federal Decisions, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 201 (1993)
(noting that in 1 1 7 cases of espionage by U.S. citizens analyzed, only 7 of the defendants
were gay or lesbian).
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creates an opportunity to gather relevant data. Only in this way can we
determine the strength of these empirical claims masquerading as
normative statements.
D. But Will Anyone Join?
Although behavior under changed norms can be difficult to
predict, it is not unrealistic to think that a substantial number of
heterosexual soldiers would opt for the inclusive command. Our
position is that many non-gay people are looking for ways to stand up
for the rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. For supportive
heterosexual people inclined to serve in the military, the inclusive
command would provide yet another way to work for the equality of
gay people.
Randy Shilts writes about Greg Teran, a heterosexual man who
attended MIT with the help of an Air Force ROTC scholarship. Teran
was troubled by the military's anti-gay policy. When assigned to do a
full briefing on "any military-related issue" for an ROTC class, he
"delivered a report to the fifteen other Air Force cadets and his unit
commander arguing that the regulations banning gays should be
rescinded."83 Teran eventually began to work for change, attending a
national conference of organizers whose goal was the elimination of
ROTC chapters from college campuses unless the Defense
Department lifted the ban on gays.84 Teran once told a flight
commander that his goal for military service was to "serve in an Air
Force that did not discriminate on race, sex, or sexual orientation."85
In his book, Honor Bound, Joseph Steffan writes that when he was
expelled from the Naval Academy because of his homosexuality, his
heterosexual friends were loyal supporters.86 Greg Teran and Steffan's
friends give us reason to believe that some heterosexuals already in
the armed forces would choose an inclusive command if it were an
option.87 Moreover, it is possible that the existence of an inclusive

83.

SHILTS, supra note

13, at 732.

84. Id.
85. Id.
JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY AMERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE RIGHT TO
SERVE HIS COUNTRY 157 (1992).

86.

87. See id.

As Shilts writes:

That y oung men like Greg Teran had taken up the cause indicated that among a segment of
the y oung heterosexual population was the dawning awareness that something was wrong in
the way society treated gay s, and that they must help do something about it. It was surely not
a social phenomenon, but it suggested a future in which homosexuals would not be
altogether alone in their fight for social acceptance.

SHILTS, supra note

13, at 732-33.
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command might draw people to the military who would otherwise
forego service.88
Recent surveys suggest that public acceptance of gays and lesbians
in the U.S. military has grown since DADT was first implemented. A
2000 study found that between 1994 and 1999, the percentage of Navy
officers who "feel uncomfortable in the presence of homosexuals"
decreased from 57.8% to 36.4%.89 An even more recent CNN/Gallup
poll conducted in December 2003 found that 79% of all Americans
believed that gay and lesbian service members should be able to serve
openly in the military. Among respondents ages 18-29, the percentage
was even higher: an astounding 91 % supported the right of openly gay
people to serve.90 This last statistic is particularly important, since it
reveals the views of the age group most likely to be serving in the U.S.
military. If these trends continue, there may be reason to expect that a
critical mass of service members would express a willingness to serve
in an inclusive command.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Essay proposes a new, incremental way to integrate sexual
minorities into the U.S. military: "inclusive commands." Built on a
system of voluntary self-assignment, the inclusive command and its
counterpart, the exclusive command, would permit soldiers to sort by
their attitudes toward homosexuality.
But is integration of the military really a worthy goal for gay rights
advocates, allies, and policymakers? Certainly, many theorists have
raised legitimate concerns about the ways the military reinforces patri
archy and constructs masculinity to the disadvantage of women and
people of color.91 One might point out that exclusion from the military,
especially combat, keeps openly gay people out of harm's way.

88. See Diane H. Mazur, A Call to A rms, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 69 (1999) ("Those
who choose not to participate can have a more powerful effect in creating an
unrepresentative military than specific policies that limit or exclude. . . .").
89. Associated Press, Polls Show Reduction Of Soldiers' Opposition To Gays (Aug. 7,
2001), available at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/ResearchResources/PressClips/news8_7
_01.htm (citing study conducted by Major John W. Bicknell of the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Cal.); see also Press Release, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in
the Military, University of California, Santa Barbara, Polls Show Reduction of Soldiers'
Opposition to Gays: New Surveys Examine Shifting Attitudes Among Military and Civilian
Populations (Aug. 6, 2001), available at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press_
rel9.htm. (summarizing data from one study showing that only 37% of Army men and 16%
of Army women "strongly opposed" to gay people serving in the military, and another study
showing only "mild dislike" for gay people among male Marines).
90. Paul Johnson, Massive Support for Gays in Military Poll Shows, 365Gay.com (Dec.
24, 2003), at http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/122403militaryPoll.htm.
91. See, e.g. , Karst, supra note 51, at 502-10.
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But focusing exclusively on the costs and dangers of military
service ignores the fact that inclusion in the military carries with it
undeniable advantages. These are twofold. First, military service
confers symbolic value: it simultaneously demonstrates and creates
patriotism and full citizenship. Second, service in the military carries
with it material benefits: job training, education, health and retirement
benefits, and political clout. It is not happenstance that military service
is an important correlate with success when candidates run for public
office.
"Don't ask, don't tell" is an inadequate means of giving gay men
and lesbians access to these benefits. As many commentators and even
a few judges have argued, the policy continues to impose on gay and
lesbian service members burdens that heterosexual soldiers need not
bear. Nominally in the service of preserving "unit cohesion," the
DADT policy forces gay and lesbian soldiers to lie about themselves,
to keep a part of themselves hidden from fellow soldiers, impeding the
very honesty and intimacy that helps to forge strong bonds of
friendship and loyalty. From the gay service members' perspective,
then, DADT does greater damage to their honest relationships with
fellow soldiers than candor about sexual orientation ever could.
Moreover, DADT does nothing to test the assumption that
heterosexual soldiers are incapable of serving with openly gay soldiers.
To move the debate further and break down these anti-gay
assumptions, we must create an environment where the assumptions
can be tested and proven to be unfounded.
The inclusive command would be one such environment. There, in
stage I, gay and heterosexual soldiers could express their willingness to
serve together. In stage II, lifting DADT in the inclusive command
would allow them to make good on those representations. In the
inclusive command, gay and heterosexual soldiers could show, with
discipline and an eye toward duty, that they can work together. With
the support of commanders who are behind the integrationist goals of
the unit, soldiers could demonstrate that unit cohesion need not suffer
in the presence of openly gay soldiers, that sexual tensions can be
managed, and that privacy can be respected. In the process, much of
the harm currently imposed by the DADT policy could be
ameliorated.
The importance of this support from higher ranking officers cannot
be overemphasized. As the RAND report concluded when it summa
rized its recommendations: "Any sense of experimentation or uncer
tainty invites those opposed to change to continue to resist and to seek
to 'prove' that the change will not work."92 Although this Essay has
referred repeatedly to the demonstration effects of the inclusive

92. RAND, supra note 72, at xxix.
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command and the opportunities for gathering data that it offers,
commanders would have to make clear to all service members that the
new regime is not an "experiment," but rather a process which they
support toward a final goal of full integration. Through the inclusive
command, the armed forces could come one step closer to the ideal
Judge Nickerson has described: "A Service called on to fight for the
principles of equality and free speech embodied in the United States
Constitution should embrace those principles in its own ranks."93

93. Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

